Oh, the trouble caused by fair value, or "mark-to-market" accounting. First, it was at the center of the Enron accounting scandal (here), when that company used this accounting rule to manipulate its earnings on energy derivatives contracts (unrealized gains on these contracts constituted one-half of the company's profits in 2000). Now it seems that mark-to-market accounting under FASB 157 may be a key contributor to the wave of bank failures and the current turmoil in the financial markets.
In the debate over the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, some of the alternative proposals involved suspending the application of FASB 157 (FASB opposed the proposals, here). Many believe that the fair value accounting, also known as "mark-to-market," required by FASB 157 for illiquid mortgage-backed assets has caused banks and other financial institutions to carry these assets on their balance sheets at far below their intrinsic value. This is one reason that supporters of the EESA believed that the government could actually make money by purchasing the distressed assets and re-selling them at a profit once the market improves.
Banks may have been writing down these assets too far because the fair value of the assets must be tied to the market value of the assets. But because these days most mortgage-backed assets are being sold in distressed, forced sales at "fire sale" prices, the market may not reflect their true value. Nonetheless, companies were applying FASB 157 to require these fire sale prices to largely establish the value of similar assets on their balance sheets. The effect of FASB 157 was aptly described in an article on CNBC's website (here):
The rule is “well-intentioned,” says Joshua Ronan, professor of accounting at NYU’s Stern School of Business, but has created the market equivalent of a "negative feedback loop" or transactional gridlock.
“If the market is temporarily depressed for a number of reasons, then you are compelled to value these assets at what you can sell them for. But any number of these assets—CDOs—are very illiquid, thus trading is thin,” explains Ronan.“As a result, you have to resort to models, and in this environment people will be very cautious and mark them down."
Although there were some proposals to amend EESA to require the suspension FASB 157 for some period of time, ultimately the EESA only included a provision, Section 133 of the Act, that required the SEC and FASB to study the role of FASB 157 in the mortgage meltdown. Under the terms of Section 133, the study will focus on the effects of FASB 157 on a financial institution's balance sheet; the impacts of such accounting on bank failures in 2008; the impact of such standards on the quality of financial information available to investors; the process used by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in developing accounting standards; the advisability and feasibility of modifications to such standards; and alternative accounting standards to those provided in FASB 157. The entire text of the EESA is available here. The SEC announced the initial steps for the study yesterday (here).
In the meantime, the SEC and FASB have provided additional guidance in the application of the mark-to-market rules in the current illiquid market for mortgage backed assets hoping to lessen the "negative feedback loop" and allow companies to reduce write-downs on assets where there has been a distressed sale of same or similar assets in the market. The SEC tells companies that:
- Management's internal assumptions on the present value of future cash flows of an asset can be used to value an asset when market for the asset does not exist.
- "Broker quotes may be an input when measuring fair value, but are not necessarily determinative if an active market does not exist for the security." Thus, when a bank goes to sell an asset and receives a low-ball bid from a broker, under this new guidance the bank does not have to mark-down the asset as a result of this lone bid.
- Companies can disregard forced-sale or distressed sales of similar assets in fair valuing mortgage backed assets: "The results of disorderly transactions are not determinative when measuring fair value. The concept of a fair value measurement assumes an orderly transaction between market participants. An orderly transaction is one that involves market participants that are willing to transact and allows for adequate exposure to the market. Distressed or forced liquidation sales are not orderly transactions, and thus the fact that a transaction is distressed or forced should be considered when weighing the available evidence. Determining whether a particular transaction is forced or disorderly requires judgment."
- Moreover, even orderly transactions in an "inactive market" do not automatically set the price of the same or similar assets.
The Mortgage Bankers Association issued a press release applauding the new guidance from the SEC and FASB, particularly the endorsement of the use of discounted cash flow to fair value assets where there is no active market. The press release states that “FAS 157 was never test driven in a market where the only transactions occurring are distressed sales. In such an environment, FAS 157 was only exacerbating the market illiquidity. This announcement should have an immediate impact allowing companies to reflect the true value of their mortgage assets and increasing capital and liquidity in today's stalled credit markets.”
Although it may take some time -- it certainly was not reflected in the stock market activity yesterday -- I think that the new guidance will have the effect envisioned by the MBA. Unfortunately this action was not taken earlier. I think the SEC's study conducted pursuant to EESA will find that the way companies were applying FASB 157 did play a significant role in our recent troubles.